How to Reindustrialize America
The Case for a Strategic Investment Fund
战略投资基金之辩
By Jake Sullivan ｜ 杰克·沙利文
July 29, 2026 ｜ 2026年7月29日
作者简介：JAKE SULLIVAN is Kissinger Professor of the Practice of Statecraft and World Order at the Harvard Kennedy School. He served as U.S. National Security Adviser from 2021 to 2025. 杰克·沙利文是哈佛大学肯尼迪学院基辛格治国方略与世界秩序实践教授，2021 至 2025 年任美国国家安全事务助理。
（有删减）
引言
EN For more than a century, America’s unmatched ability to invent, build, and diffuse technology underwrote its prosperity and power. That foundation is now under strain in a new era of state-driven competition. The economists David Autor and David Dorn have warned of a “second China shock,” not of cheap exports, but of technological primacy. Beijing is vying for global leadership across the frontier of advanced industries, including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, aerospace, next-generation energy, and biotechnology.
中 一个多世纪以来，美国无与伦比的发明、制造与技术扩散能力，支撑起它的繁荣与实力。如今，在国家驱动竞争的新时代，这一根基正承受压力。经济学家戴维·奥特尔（David Autor）与戴维·多恩（David Dorn）警告称，一场”第二次中国冲击”正在到来——这一次冲击不再是廉价出口，而是技术主导权。北京正在人工智能、量子计算、航空航天、下一代能源和生物技术等先进产业前沿争夺全球领导地位。
EN It has done so by constructing a vast, decentralized system of state-backed innovation finance, channeling subsidized capital into priority high-tech sectors and encouraging firms to compete ruthlessly for scale. The result is a market systematically tilted by state intervention, one in which Chinese firms can overbuild capacity and flood markets before American and allied competitors can scale up production. China’s strategy has created a technology ecosystem that now rivals—and in some areas surpasses—that of the United States.
中 中国做到这一点的方式，是构建了一个庞大而分散的国家支持的创新融资体系，将补贴资本导向优先高科技领域，并鼓励企业为规模而残酷竞争。其结果是市场被干预系统性倾斜：在美国及其盟国竞争者扩大产能之前，中国企业就能过度建设产能、淹没市场。中国的战略造就了一个如今可与美国相匹敌、在某些领域甚至已经超越美国的技术生态系统。
EN At the same time China was building its industrial strength, the United States was allowing much of its productive base to migrate abroad. For a few decades, that shift appeared to carry few strategic costs. America remained the world’s leading center of research and invention even as manufacturing employment fell and supply chains stretched across continents. But the costs of separating innovation from production are now too great to ignore. As factories have moved offshore, the United States has lost much of its skilled workforce and the expertise to build at speed and scale. If it does not change course, the country could cede its technological edge, and, in time, its broader global leadership, to China.
中 在中国锻造工业实力的同时，美国却放任其大部分生产基础流向海外。几十年来，这一转变似乎没有带来什么战略代价：即便制造业就业下降、供应链横跨各大洲，美国仍是全球研究与发明的领先中心。但如今，将创新与生产割裂的代价已经大到不容忽视。随着工厂迁往海外，美国流失了大量熟练劳动力，以及快速、规模化制造的专业能力。如果美国不改变方向，它可能把技术优势——乃至更广泛的全球领导地位——拱手让给中国。
EN To avoid eroding what Alexander Hamilton called “the essentials of national supply,” the United States must revive the ecosystems that allow complex, high-value manufacturing to flourish. Simply put, America must get better at making what it designs.
中 为避免侵蚀亚历山大·汉密尔顿所称的”国家供给的要义”，美国必须重振能让复杂、高价值制造业繁荣发展的生态系统。简言之，美国必须更擅长把它设计出来的东西制造出来。
EN But Washington should not aim to copy Beijing’s state-backed playbook wholesale. After all, the United States has plenty of advantages over China, including its entrepreneurs, universities, and capital markets, which are the deepest in the world. But those markets optimize for efficiency, not resilience or security. The challenge, then, is to turn capital into capability, to channel investment toward the industries that anchor modern national strength and economic vitality: advanced computing, biotechnology, robotics, critical minerals, pharmaceutical precursors, advanced manufacturing, and the electric-energy backbone. And the solution is an ambitious national strategic investment enterprise, headlined by a federal Strategic Investment Fund.
中 但华盛顿不应全盘照搬北京的国有扶持剧本。毕竟，美国相对中国拥有诸多优势，包括企业家、大学，以及全球最深的资本市场。但这些市场的优化目标是效率，而非韧性与安全。因此挑战在于：把资本转化为能力，将投资引向支撑现代国家实力与经济活力的产业——先进计算、生物技术、机器人、关键矿产、医药前体、先进制造业，以及电力能源主干。而解决方案，就是一项以联邦”战略投资基金”为龙头的、雄心勃勃的国家战略投资事业。
FOUNDER FATHERS ｜ 开国先贤
EN Since its founding, the United States has treated finance as an instrument of sovereignty. In his 1791 Report on Manufactures to Congress, Hamilton made the case that economic independence was inseparable from political independence. The young republic, he argued, had to use public credit to nurture productive industry and national strength. Hamilton envisioned a pragmatic model of state-enabled capitalism, in which loans and “bounties” encouraged “infant manufactures,” tariffs protected strategic sectors, and public institutions channeled capital toward long-term national aims. Whenever the United States has faced existential tests, its leaders have returned to Hamilton’s logic.
中 自建国以来，美国一直把金融视为主权的工具。在 1791 年提交国会的《关于制造业的报告》中，汉密尔顿论证了经济独立与政治独立不可分割。他认为，这个年轻的共和国必须运用公共信用来培育生产性工业与国家实力。汉密尔顿设想了一种务实的”国家赋能的资本主义”模式：贷款和”赏金”鼓励”幼稚制造业”，关税保护战略部门，公共机构将资本导向长期国家目标。每当美国面临生死存亡的考验，其领导人都会回到汉密尔顿的逻辑。
EN When credit markets froze during the Great Depression and World War II, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), created in 1932, filled the gap and served as a strategic investor, financing banks, utilities, housing, and manufacturing, earning returns and restoring confidence in U.S. markets. Its wartime subsidiary, the Defense Plant Corporation (DPC), built more than 2,000 factories and shipyards, eventually transferring them to private operators, creating the foundations for America’s postwar dominance in steel, aviation, and chemicals.
中 当大萧条与二战期间信贷市场冻结时，1932 年成立的重建金融公司（RFC）填补了缺口，扮演战略投资者的角色：为银行、公用事业、住房和制造业提供融资，赚取回报并重建美国市场的信心。其战时子公司国防工厂公司（DPC）建造了 2000 多家工厂和船厂，最终将它们移交给私营运营商，为美国战后在钢铁、航空和化工领域的主导地位奠定了基础。
EN The DPC ceased operations with the end of the war and the RFC wound down in 1957, but with their independent balance sheets and professional business management, they modeled what a responsible public investment apparatus could look like. They showed that effectively deployed public capital can be used to invest in important industries private capital is either unwilling or unable to finance by itself.
中 DPC 随战争结束而停止运作，RFC 于 1957 年逐步关停。但凭借独立的资产负债表和专业化的商业管理，它们示范了一个负责任的公共投资机构应当是什么样子。它们证明：有效配置的公共资本，可以投资于私人资本不愿或无力单独融资的重要产业。
EN During the Cold War, Washington built a constellation of new institutions that linked scientific ambition to strategic purpose as it sought advantage over the Soviet Union. The founding of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), NASA, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the national laboratories reflected a recognition by Washington that geopolitical competition required sustained public investment.
中 冷战期间，为了在对苏竞争中取得优势，华盛顿建立了一整套新机构，把科学抱负与战略目标联结起来。国防高级研究计划局（DARPA）、NASA、原子能委员会和国家实验室的创立，反映了华盛顿的一个共识：地缘政治竞争需要持续的公共投入。
EN The approach worked. Early defense- and space-related procurement of semiconductors provided the demand that, over time, made the technology cheaper and more efficient to produce. The U.S. Air Force’s Minuteman program and NASA’s Apollo missions bought thousands of chips when no private buyer would. As government demand grew and costs fell, a full commercial American semiconductor ecosystem took shape. Fairchild was founded in 1957, followed by Intel and AMD in the 1960s and Micron in the 1970s. Existing tech companies such as Texas Instruments and Motorola expanded their semiconductor businesses to include military and commercial applications.
中 这套做法奏效了。早期与国防和航天相关的半导体采购提供了需求，随着时间推移，这项技术变得更便宜、更高效。在没有任何私人买家时，美国空军的”民兵”导弹计划与 NASA 的阿波罗任务购买了数以千计的芯片。随着政府需求增长、成本下降，一个完整的美国商用半导体生态系统成形了。仙童半导体于 1957 年创立，随后是 1960 年代的英特尔和 AMD、1970 年代的美光。德州仪器、摩托罗拉等老牌科技公司则把半导体业务拓展到军用和商用领域。
EN By the mid-1970s, however, the broader political and economic consensus supporting an expansive federal role in industrial development began to weaken. Inflation, energy shocks, and their attendant fiscal strain eroded public confidence in the government’s ability to play a constructive role in the economy. A new consensus took hold in Washington that markets, more agile and disciplined than public bureaucracies, were the only real tool to allocate capital effectively.
中 然而到了 1970 年代中期，支持联邦在工业发展中扮演扩张性角色的政治经济共识开始松动。通胀、能源冲击以及随之而来的财政压力，侵蚀了公众对政府能在经济中发挥建设性作用的信心。华盛顿形成了一种新的共识：市场比公共官僚机构更敏捷、更有纪律，是有效配置资本的唯一真正工具。
EN Through the 1980s and 1990s, Washington’s remit narrowed from investor to regulator. Where it once helped build industries, it now confined itself to setting the rules of market competition through antitrust and disclosure regulations.
中 在整个 1980、1990 年代，华盛顿的职能范围从”投资者”收窄为”监管者”。它曾经帮助建造产业，如今却只满足于通过反垄断和披露法规来设定市场竞争规则。
EN Agencies such as the National Institutes of Health and DARPA remained formidable through the market liberalization of the Reagan years and the fiscal discipline and global integration of the Clinton administration, but the connective tissue between research, finance, and production atrophied. In the first three decades of the twenty-first century, it has only started to recover.
中 美国国立卫生研究院、DARPA 等机构穿越了里根时代的市场自由化和克林顿政府的财政纪律与全球一体化，依旧强大；但研究、金融与生产之间的”结缔组织”萎缩了。直到二十一世纪的头三十年，它才开始恢复。
INVESTMENT WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS ｜ 中国特色投资
EN A generation after the first China shock hollowed out America’s manufacturing base, a second one is underway. In the twenty-first century, Beijing has made technological leadership a national project, mobilizing finance, procurement, and policy to pursue commanding positions in frontier industries.
中 在第一波”中国冲击”掏空美国制造业基础的一代人之后，第二波冲击正在进行。进入二十一世纪，北京把技术领先当作一项国家工程，调动金融、采购和政策力量，在前沿产业中争夺主导地位。
EN China has built a comprehensive system of state-guided investment that blends central strategy with decentralized experimentation. Provinces, cities, and national ministries have created more than 1,700 “guidance funds,” raising nearly $700 billion in capital. With the support of government-provided land and permits, these professionally managed, profit-seeking vehicles direct equity into priority sectors. The approach has generated immense duplication and waste, but it has also produced national champions able to globally dominate their industries, such as the battery manufacturer CATL, the solar technology producer LONGi, the drone producer DJI, and telecommunications giant Huawei. At the same time, China is converting the knowledge generated in the manufacture of these products into gains at the innovation frontier, including in industries the United States has traditionally dominated, such as biotechnology.
中 中国构建了一个把中央战略与地方分散试验相结合的国家引导投资体系。省、市和国家部委创立了 1700 多只”引导基金”，募资近 7000 亿美元。在政府提供的土地和许可支持下，这些由专业团队管理、追求利润的载体把股权资本投入优先领域。这一做法产生了巨大的重复建设与浪费，但也造就了一批能够在全球称霸本行业的”国家队冠军”，如电池制造商宁德时代、光伏技术商隆基、无人机制造商大疆，以及电信巨头华为。与此同时，中国正在把这些产品制造中产生的知识转化为创新前沿的收益，包括生物技术等美国传统上占据主导地位的行业。
EN The Chinese system extends beyond financing supply. It also creates demand. National and municipal authorities have created new markets through a blend of subsidies, procurement, and regulation. Take Shenzhen’s promotion of electric vehicles. By mandating the electrification of its bus and taxi fleets, the city gave BYD, then an emerging EV maker, guaranteed demand, stable cash flow, and real-world feedback that private markets could not provide on their own. An industrial EV commons soon bloomed. Battery and electronics suppliers clustered around BYD, city and grid companies built charging and testing infrastructure, and local universities produced a steady pipeline of EV engineers and technicians. BYD has since surpassed Tesla in global unit sales, and China has overtaken Japan as the world’s largest auto exporter.
中 中国的体系不止于融资供给，它还创造需求。国家和城市主管部门通过补贴、采购与监管的组合，开辟了新市场。以深圳推广电动汽车为例：通过强制公交和出租车车队电动化，这座城市给了当时还是新兴造车企业的比亚迪以有保障的需求、稳定的现金流，以及私人市场无法提供的真实世界反馈。一个工业化的电动汽车”公共地”很快繁荣起来：电池和电子供应商围绕比亚迪集聚，城市与电网公司建设充电和测试基础设施，本地高校持续输送电动汽车工程师和技术人员。此后比亚迪在全球销量上超越了特斯拉，中国则超过日本成为全球最大汽车出口国。
EN Beijing has embraced a lesson the United States, during its competition with the Soviet Union, understood well: technological leadership depends not only on invention, but also on industrial power. China has adapted that logic to its own political system, replacing the U.S. public investment–private enterprise partnership with its party-state capitalist model.
中 北京汲取了美国在与苏联竞争时期深谙的教训：技术领先不仅取决于发明创造，还取决于工业实力。中国把这一逻辑适配到自己的政治体制中，用党国资本主义模式取代了美国的”公共投资—私人企业”伙伴关系。
BRAWN DRAIN ｜ 力量流失
EN For much of the twentieth century, the United States, blessed with vast natural resources, built the world’s most formidable industrial base, its “arsenal of democracy.” But recent crises have exposed how thin the nation’s capacity to build has become. The world relies on Taiwan for production of the most advanced chips, a single and fragile point of failure. In pharmaceuticals, nearly 700 U.S.-approved medicines, including critical drugs such as antibiotics, depend on at least one chemical produced solely in China. China also dominates rare-earth and graphite refining, essential for the magnets and batteries that power defense and clean energy systems. A scarcity of American dry docks limits naval readiness, and a dependence on imported power transformers has slowed upgrades to the national power grid and left it vulnerable to prolonged outages.
中 在二十世纪的大部分时间里，坐拥广袤自然资源的美国建成了世界上最强大的工业基础，即它的”民主兵工厂”。但近年的危机暴露了这个国家制造能力已何等单薄。世界依赖台湾生产最先进的芯片——这是一个脆弱而单一化的故障点。在制药领域，近 700 种美国批准的药物（包括抗生素等关键药品）依赖至少一种仅在中国生产的化学品。中国还主导着稀土和石墨的精炼——它们是驱动国防与清洁能源系统的磁体和电池的关键原料。美国干船坞的稀缺限制了海军战备，而对进口电力变压器的依赖则拖慢了国家电网的升级，使其易受长时间停电的冲击。
EN While China builds tightly clustered ecosystems where suppliers, materials, and manufacturing move seamlessly from design to mass production, the United States has allowed its “electric tech stack”—the linked supply chains for critical minerals, batteries, power electronics, and chips—to drift offshore, weakening industrial learning and depth.
中 当中国构建起高度集聚的生态系统，让供应商、材料与制造从设计到量产无缝衔接时，美国却放任自己的”电力技术栈”——即关键矿产、电池、电力电子和芯片相互关联的供应链——漂移海外，削弱了工业学习效应与产业深度。
EN MIT’s Task Force on Production in the Innovation Economy has demonstrated that in complex, high-value industries, innovation depends on proximity between design and production. When manufacturing migrates abroad, the feedback loops between engineers and factory floors break down and innovation suffers. Reindustrialization, done right, is a precondition for renewing the United States’ inventive edge and the foundation of its strategic strength.
中 麻省理工学院”创新经济中的生产”工作组已经证明：在复杂、高价值的产业中，创新取决于设计与生产的邻近性。当制造迁移海外，工程师与工厂车间之间的反馈回路就会断裂，创新随之受损。做对了的再工业化，是重振美国创新优势的前提，也是其战略实力的根基。
CAPITAL CONSTRAINTS ｜ 资本约束
EN The United States commands the world’s most sophisticated capital markets, but they are optimized for fields in which revenue can be easily underwritten and risk can be diversified, where feedback is quick and failure is relatively inexpensive. The investments required for American reindustrialization, however, do not necessarily fit that mold. Three main financial hurdles stand in the way.
中 美国拥有全球最成熟的资本市场，但这些市场是为”收入易于承销、风险可以分散、反馈迅速、失败代价相对低廉”的领域而优化的。然而，美国再工业化所需的投资未必符合这种模式。三道主要融资障碍横亘在前。
EN First, some strategic industrial sectors depend on conditions that private markets cannot reliably provide or price. Nuclear plants, semiconductor fabs, shipyards, transformer factories, and rare-earth refineries require considerable upfront capital, decades-long horizons for return on investment, policy stability, and confidence in long-term demand. A shift in tariffs, procurement rules, grid standards, or commodity prices can erase returns overnight. The rational response for investors is to wait and see before committing to large outlays of capital. From each investor’s standpoint, that caution is prudent, but at the societal level, it leads to underinvestment. Government policy can change that equation. When the state provides some certainty with long-term offtake contracts, stable regulations, or guaranteed price floors, it gives investors the predictability they need, and private capital follows.
中 首先，一些战略性工业部门依赖私人市场无法可靠提供或定价的条件。核电站、半导体晶圆厂、船厂、变压器工厂和稀土精炼厂都需要巨额前期资本、数十年的投资回报周期、政策稳定性，以及对长期需求的信心。关税、采购规则、电网标准或大宗商品价格的任何变动，都可能在一夜之间抹掉回报。投资者的理性反应是观望，再决定是否投入大笔资金。站在每个投资者的立场，这种谨慎是明智的；但站在社会层面，它导致了投资不足。政府政策可以改变这一等式。当国家通过长期承购协议、稳定的监管或保底价格提供某种确定性时，投资者便获得了所需的可预见性，私人资本随之跟进。
EN Next, research by the Production in the Innovation Economy Task Force has shown that the United States faces a financing gap in the “scale up” stage between venture funding and public markets, when promising technologies must move from prototype to production. Large multinationals can draw on internal cash flow to bridge that gap, but both main-street manufacturers (the majority of American manufacturing) and advanced-manufacturing startups cannot. The local banks that once financed smaller regional producers have disappeared, and venture investors tend to avoid factory capital, which they see as asset heavy and too slow to yield venture-level returns. The result is a structural shortfall in financing that can carry companies through the long, risky, and capital-intensive scale-up phase.
中 其次，“创新经济中的生产”工作组的研究表明，美国在风险投资与公开市场之间的”规模化”阶段存在融资缺口——正是在这一阶段，有前景的技术必须从原型走向量产。大型跨国企业可以动用内部现金流来弥合这一缺口，但普通制造商（占美国制造业的大多数）和先进制造初创企业都做不到。曾经为中小区域生产商融资的地方银行已经消失，风险投资者则往往回避厂房资本，他们认为这类资产太重、回报太慢，达不到风投水平的收益。其结果是：在漫长、高风险、资本密集的规模化阶段，存在结构性的融资短缺。
EN Finally, markets fail to value positive externalities, the spillovers that result when private investments create social or strategic benefits that cannot be fully captured by the investor. Strategic physical industries, including advanced manufacturing, clean energy, semiconductors, and robotics, create learning-by-doing, supplier networks, and engineering capabilities that strengthen the broader manufacturing ecosystem but do not always generate financial returns for a single firm.
中 最后，市场无法为正向外部性定价——即私人投资创造了投资者无法完全占有的社会或战略收益时产生的溢出效应。先进制造、清洁能源、半导体、机器人等战略性实体产业会产生”干中学”效应、供应商网络和工程能力，这些强化了整个制造业生态系统，却未必为单个企业带来财务回报。
EN The course of American manufacturing illustrates this dynamic. Once production ecosystems fragment, they are exceedingly hard to rebuild. U.S. shipbuilding, for example, collapsed after the 1980s, when government subsidies were withdrawn, erasing supplier depth and design expertise. From the 1980s onward, the offshoring of U.S. transformer or machine-tool manufacturing reduced procurement costs for downstream firms in the short run but wiped out the domestic base of engineers and component makers. Each firm’s offshoring decision might have made sense in isolation, but collectively they weakened the nation’s process knowledge and with it its productive core.
中 美国制造业的历程印证了这一动态。生产生态系统一旦碎裂，重建就极其困难。例如，美国造船业在 1980 年代后崩溃——政府补贴被撤回，供应商深度与设计专长随之消失。1980 年代起，美国变压器和机床制造的离岸化，短期降低了下游企业的采购成本，却抹掉了国内的工程师和零部件制造商基础。每个企业的离岸决策单独看或许都合理，但合在一起，它们削弱了国家的工艺知识，进而削弱了其生产内核。
EN Geopolitics compounds these market failures. Chinese state-backed interventions into these industries crowd American and allied producers out of markets, even when those producers are technological leaders. As one innovative U.S. manufacturing CEO told me, raising U.S. capital for his first-of-a-kind technology was a series of near-death experiences—one that was quickly undercut by a flood of copycat Chinese competitors propped up by state subsidies, free land, and guaranteed buyers.
中 地缘政治加剧了这些市场失灵。中国对相关产业的国有扶持介入，把美国及其盟国的生产商挤出市场——即便这些生产商是技术领先者。正如一位美国创新制造企业的 CEO 对我所说：为自己的首创技术筹集美国资本，是一连串濒死体验——然后迅速被一大群靠国家补贴、免费土地和有保障买家撑起来的中国模仿者竞争者所冲击。
EN Yet the hurdle for American industry is as much a fragmented state at home as it is a subsidized rival abroad. In sectors such as nuclear energy or mineral processing, the hindrance is often not just a lack of capital but the prohibitive “soft costs” and uncertainty of a disjointed permitting and regulatory landscape, as well. Navigating this bureaucracy exhausts years of capital, creating no tangible value along the way. And inconsistent and slow government procurement fails to provide the stable demand necessary for firms to reach scale.
中 然而，美国工业面临的障碍，既来自海外受补贴的对手，也同样来自国内支离破碎的国家机器。在核电或矿产加工等行业，障碍往往不仅是缺乏资本，还有令人望而却步的”软成本”以及碎片化许可与监管环境带来的不确定性。穿梭于这套官僚体系会耗尽数年的资本，却沿途创造不出任何有形价值。而不稳定、缓慢的政府采购，也无法提供企业达到规模所需的稳定需求。
EN Washington’s public investment, then, must be paired with a new policy approach. It does not need to match Beijing dollar for dollar. But it must correct a structural imbalance between its financial depth and its productive capacity that markets alone cannot.
中 因此，华盛顿的公共投资必须与一套新的政策方法相配套。它不需要与北京逐美元对等，但必须纠正一个市场自身无法纠正的结构性失衡——即金融深度与生产能力之间的失衡。
CONNECT THE DOTS ｜ 连接各点
EN The United States still operates the world’s most powerful early-stage innovation system. DARPA, the national laboratories, and the Defense Innovation Unit continue to support breakthrough technologies. The Defense Production Act and the Office of Strategic Capital provide targeted loans and guarantees in critical security areas. But without a shared framework to coordinate the core instruments of economic statecraft, individual investments are blunted by procedural friction and institutional misalignment.
中 美国仍在运营着世界上最强大的早期创新体系。DARPA、国家实验室和国防创新单元持续支持突破性技术。《国防生产法》和战略资本办公室在关键安全领域提供定向贷款与担保。但如果没有一个共享框架来协调经济治国方略的核心工具，各项投资就会被程序摩擦和机构错位所钝化。
EN Because the United States lacks such a framework dictating which industries are strategically vital and what baseline domestic or allied capacity is required, federal action has been reactive and crisis driven. The first Trump administration used emergency authorities to secure personal protective equipment and medical supplies under COVID; the Biden administration made targeted interventions to sustain munitions and solid-rocket-motor production after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; and both the Biden and second Trump administrations invoked the Defense Production Act to support rare-earth processing and permanent magnet capacity as Chinese export threats mounted. As long as Washington lacks a comprehensive strategy, actions will remain episodic and narrow, vulnerable to reversal across administrations.
中 由于美国缺乏这样一套框架来界定哪些产业具有战略重要性、需要何种国内或盟国的基础产能，联邦行动一直是反应式、危机驱动式的。第一届特朗普政府在新冠疫情下动用紧急权力保障个人防护装备和医疗物资；拜登政府在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后采取定向干预，维持弹药和固体火箭发动机的生产；拜登政府和第二届特朗普政府都援引《国防生产法》，在中国出口威胁升级时支持稀土加工和永磁体产能。只要华盛顿缺乏全面战略，行动就仍将零散而狭窄，且易被跨政府换届所逆转。
EN Even where priorities are clear, the United States lacks an institution capable of synchronizing investment, demand-side commitments, regulation, and trade policy behind shared objectives. Previous administrations have assembled deals by combining authorities across different agencies. In recent years, rare-earth and battery-materials investments have moved forward without appropriated long-term procurement or market-stabilization mechanisms; CHIPS Act incentives have been negotiated project by project with uneven integration of trade defenses or downstream demand; and efforts to rebuild shipbuilding and transformer capacity continue to run up against onerous federal, state, and local permitting and regulatory processes.
中 即便在优先事项明确的地方，美国也缺乏一个能把投资、需求侧承诺、监管和贸易政策同步到共同目标之后的机构。历届政府都是靠拼凑不同机构的权限来撮合交易。近年来，稀土和电池材料的投资在没有获批的长期采购或市场稳定机制的情况下推进；《芯片法》激励措施逐项目谈判，与贸易防御或下游需求的整合参差不齐；重建造船和变压器产能的努力，则持续撞上繁重的联邦、州和地方许可与监管程序。
EN The United States also lacks a permanent public investor embedded in capital markets that can partner directly with private funds, banks, and institutional investors. Strategic investments are negotiated agency by agency through bespoke programs that sit outside normal deal flow, limiting the government’s ability to price risk, mobilize large pools of private capital, or scale proven structures across sectors. Without a professional, repeatable coinvestment platform, public support too often serves as a substitute for private finance rather than as a catalyst for it.
中 美国还缺乏一个嵌入资本市场、能与私人基金、银行和机构投资者直接合作的常设公共投资者。战略投资都是通过一个个游离于常规交易流之外的定制项目，逐机构地谈判达成，这限制了政府为风险定价、调动大额私人资本、或跨行业推广成熟结构的能力。没有一个专业化、可复制的共同投资平台，公共支持往往沦为私人融资的替代品，而不是催化剂。
EN Finally, the United States has no institutional vehicle to align its strategic investments with allies. Instead, administrations have in recent years shoehorned ad hoc investment “funds” into trade deals with allies such as Japan and South Korea. Without a way to coordinate investment, shared procurement, and trade and industrial policy, allies fragment markets and duplicate subsidies; they cannot provide the scale and staying power needed to compete with China’s state-backed system.
中 最后，美国没有任何制度性工具来协调与盟友的战略投资。相反，近年来各届政府把临时拼凑的投资”基金”硬塞进与日本、韩国等盟友的贸易协定里。由于缺乏协调投资、共同采购以及贸易和产业政策的机制，盟友之间市场碎片化、补贴重复化；它们无法提供与中国国有扶持体系竞争所需的规模和持久力。
EN Several allied governments have already begun addressing these institutional gaps. In 2024, the United Kingdom launched a 16 billion initiative anchored by $9.5 billion in production tax credits for hydrogen and critical mineral refining, paired with a centralized investment-coordination framework. The United States should work with—and learn from—these and other allies.
中 一些盟国政府已经开始着手弥补这些制度缺口。2024 年，英国启动了 370 亿美元的国家财富基金，以”撬动”私人资本投入战略基础设施和能源安全。同年，澳大利亚推出了”澳大利亚制造的未来”计划——一项 160 亿美元的倡议，以 95 亿美元的生产税收抵免为核心，用于氢能和关键矿产精炼，并配以集中化的投资协调框架。美国应当与这些盟友及其他盟友合作，并向它们学习。
HOW TO MAKE IT IN AMERICA ｜ 如何在美国造出来
EN Throughout its history, the United States built institutions that channeled capital toward a national strategy. Resurrecting that tradition today would mean establishing a new kind of public investor: a U.S. Strategic Investment Fund (SIF), a federally chartered, market-facing public investor with its own balance sheet, designed to invest alongside private capital in strategically critical industries, both mature and emerging, where markets alone have proven insufficient.
中 纵观其历史，美国一直在建立把资本导向国家战略的机构。今天复活这一传统，意味着设立一种新型公共投资者：美国战略投资基金（SIF）——一家联邦特许、面向市场、拥有独立资产负债表的公共投资者，旨在与私人资本共同投资于市场已被证明无法独自胜任的战略关键产业，无论是成熟产业还是新兴产业。
EN The SIF would launch with 50 billion would be large enough to support a diversified portfolio yet limited enough to allow Congress to evaluate the model before any expansion. Loans and guarantees would stretch each public dollar and crowd in private capital, and convertible and equity-like instruments could give taxpayers a share of upside when investments succeed.
中 SIF 将以 500 亿美元启动——规模与《芯片与科学法案》相当，但授权范围更广——并在证明自己有能力审慎投资、调动私人资本后随时间逐步扩大。该基金将部署多种证券与企业合作，重点提供优惠融资和信用担保，同时运用可转换债券及其他类股权证券，以换取投资灵活性和纳税人的上行收益。500 亿美元的初始资本，足以支撑一个多元化的投资组合，又足够克制，让国会在任何扩张之前先评估这一模式。贷款与担保能让每一美元公共资金发挥乘数效应并撬动私人资本；可转换与类股权工具则可在投资成功时让纳税人分享上行收益。
EN The fund would build on recent initiatives to invest in American industrial competitiveness at home and abroad, including the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital and Economic Defense Unit, the Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office, the Development Finance Corporation, and the CHIPS and Science Act, as well as ad hoc capital interventions from Departments of Commerce and Energy. Rather than replace these efforts, it would effectively unite the nation’s investment, trade, procurement, and regulatory tools within a single framework of economic statecraft.
中 该基金将建立在近期国内外投资美国工业竞争力的各项举措之上，包括五角大楼的战略资本办公室与经济防御单元、能源部的贷款项目办公室、美国国际开发金融公司（DFC）、《芯片与科学法案》，以及商务部与能源部零散的资本干预。它不是取代这些努力，而是把国家的投资、贸易、采购和监管工具统一到一个经济治国方略的单一框架之内。
EN To create a coherent strategic finance strategy, a cabinet-level Strategic Investment Council would coordinate investments with federal procurement, targeted tariffs, tax incentives, regulatory processes, credit programs, and other policy tools. Chaired by the Treasury Department, the council would include the heads of the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, and State, as well as the U.S. Trade Representative. Its central task would be to align the nation’s policy and investment levers.
中 为形成连贯的战略金融战略，一个内阁级别的战略投资委员会将协调投资与联邦采购、定向关税、税收激励、监管程序、信贷项目及其他政策工具的配合。该委员会由财政部牵头，成员包括商务部、国防部、能源部、国务院的负责人以及美国贸易代表。其核心任务，是让国家的政策杠杆与投资杠杆对齐。
EN The council would also organize multiyear purchasing commitments from the Department of Defense and other major agencies for critical assets such as shipbuilding, grid transformers, and long-duration energy storage, providing the predictable demand and cash flows private investors need to underwrite projects that would be otherwise unfinanceable. And it would assist priority projects by streamlining permitting and resolving interagency bottlenecks.
中 该委员会还将组织国防部和其他主要机构对造船、电网变压器、长时储能等关键资产作出多年期采购承诺，提供私人投资者承销这些项目所需的可预见需求与现金流——否则这些项目根本无法融资。它还将通过简化许可、化解跨机构瓶颈来支持优先项目。
EN The SIF would be governed by a professional board of independent directors drawn from finance, industry, and labor, with a minority of ex officio members from Treasury, Commerce, Defense, and Energy providing oversight. In the spirit of the RFC, an experienced private-sector chief executive would be confirmed by the Senate and serve a fixed term, accountable to Congress and the public. The goal would be to build in as many guardrails against abuse as possible.
中 SIF 将由一个由金融、产业和劳工界人士组成的专业独立董事董事会治理，财政部、商务部、国防部和能源部的少数当然成员负责监督。秉承 RFC 的精神，一位经验丰富的私营部门首席执行官将经参议院确认，任期固定，对国会和公众负责。目标是尽可能内置防范滥用的护栏。
EN To maintain focus, the SIF would lead a systematic and transparent process to identify the sectors that require a baseline of manufacturing capacity in the United States and among trusted allies. It would seek to answer the questions facing American reindustrialization posed by the economic historian Chris Miller, including: whether a given product could be monopolized and used for geopolitical leverage; whether U.S. manufacturing capacity is ready to withstand a crisis; and whether preserving today’s manufacturing ecosystem in a given sector is necessary to develop tomorrow’s.
中 为保持聚焦，SIF 将主导一个系统、透明的流程，识别哪些部门需要在美国及可信盟友间保有基础制造产能。它将寻求回答经济史学家克里斯·米勒（Chris Miller）为美国再工业化提出的问题，包括：某一产品是否可能被垄断并用作地缘政治杠杆；美国制造能力是否足以承受危机；以及保留某一行业今天的制造生态系统，是否为培育明天的产业所必需。
EN The fund’s investment approach would recognize that different sectors require different kinds of support. For capital-intensive industries such as shipbuilding and basic battery cells, which are essentially mature and competitively undifferentiated, and in which scale, learning curves, and foreign subsidies define competitiveness, the SIF would help reestablish a base level of foundational capacity. It could pursue joint ventures with trusted and cutting-edge allied firms and pair investment with policy tools: targeted tariffs to counter distortions, multiyear procurement and offtake agreements to create predictable demand, guarantees to unlock private financing, and time-limited tax credits to move plants down the cost curve. Once U.S. capacity grows, the fund could then step back as commercial capital takes over.
中 该基金的投资方式将承认：不同行业需要不同类型的支持。对于造船、基础电池电芯等资本密集型产业——它们本质上已成熟、竞争上无差异化，规模、学习曲线和外国补贴决定竞争力——SIF 将帮助重建基础产能的底数。它可以与可信且领先的盟国企业组建合资公司，并把投资与政策工具配对：以定向关税对抗扭曲，以多年期采购和承购协议创造可预见需求，以担保解锁私人融资，以限时税收抵免推动工厂沿成本曲线下行。一旦美国产能增长起来，商业资本接手后，基金即可逐步退出。
EN Innovation-led sectors, such as advanced robotics, next-generation nuclear power, energy storage, biotech, and advanced materials, present a different challenge. In these industries, firms can differentiate themselves through technological innovation, but many remain stuck in the chasm between prototype and production. Here, flexible public capital has the highest leverage. The SIF would bridge the scale-up gap by providing attractive financing, coordinating demand signals, and helping commercially viable technologies reach production scale in the United States.
中 先进机器人、下一代核电、储能、生物科技和先进材料等创新主导型行业则构成不同挑战。在这些产业中，企业可以靠技术创新实现差异化，但许多企业仍困在原型与量产之间的鸿沟里。在这里，灵活的公共资本杠杆作用最大。SIF 将通过提供优惠融资、协调需求信号，帮助商业上可行的技术在美国达到量产规模，从而弥合规模化缺口。
EN The fund’s reach would not stop at U.S. firms. Taking cues from the CHIPS Act’s funding of the Taiwanese semiconductor fab TSMC and the Korean electronics company Samsung, the SIF could support trusted foreign partners building industrial capacity in the United States through joint ventures, the construction of new facilities, and technology partnerships. Such investments would accelerate the transfer of cutting-edge know-how, diversify supply chains, and embed allied firms in the U.S. industrial base, particularly for industries such as shipbuilding, where foreign producers (often with the help of subsidies) have driven scale and cost efficiencies. Finally, the SIF would serve as a platform for allied investment coordination. By aligning resources and policies in areas of common interest, allies could approach China’s scale without replicating its model.
中 该基金的触角不会止步于美国企业。借鉴《芯片法》资助中国台湾晶圆代工厂台积电（TSMC）和韩国电子公司三星的做法，SIF 可以通过合资、建设新设施和技术合作，支持可信的外国伙伴在美国构建工业产能。这类投资将加速尖端专有技术的转移、分散供应链，并把盟国企业嵌入美国工业基础——尤其对造船等产业意义重大，因为在那里，外国生产商（往往在补贴帮助下）已经推动了规模与成本效率。最后，SIF 还将作为盟国投资协调的平台。通过在共同利益领域对齐资源与政策，盟国可以接近中国的规模，而无需复制中国的模式。
FUND-AMENTAL DISAGREEMENTS ｜ 根本性分歧
注：小标题 “FUND-AMENTAL” 为双关（fund 基金 + fundamental 根本的）。
EN Opponents of a sovereign investment fund might object on the grounds that it could become a tool of corruption through which presidents could reward cronies or enrich themselves. Their concern is valid. A public investor empowered to direct large sums toward individual firms could become a vehicle for favoritism. But that risk is not unique to a strategic investment fund; it is in the nature of executive power itself. Any institution with real financial power can be steered toward self-dealing or political reward if a president chooses to do so. The fund’s design, then, should prioritize managing that risk by structuring it to preserve as much political independence as possible. Leadership would serve under a majority-independent board, separating political direction from day-to-day investment decisions. A professional staff would operate under published criteria. Every transaction would be disclosed, audited, and bound by portfolio-level return targets that enforce financial discipline.
中 主权投资基金的反对者可能会以”它可能成为腐败工具，总统借此酬谢亲信或中饱私囊”为由反对。他们的担忧是合理的：一个有权把大笔资金导向单个企业的公共投资者，可能沦为偏袒的工具。但这种风险并非战略投资基金独有——它是行政权力本身的固有属性。任何拥有真实金融权力的机构，如果总统执意如此，都可以被导向自我交易或政治酬庸。因此，基金的设计应优先管理这一风险，通过结构安排尽量保持政治独立性：管理层在独立董事占多数的董事会领导下工作，使政治指令与日常投资决策分离；专业团队依据公开标准运作；每笔交易都要披露、审计，并受投资组合层面回报目标的约束，以强制财务纪律。
EN Others might frame public investment in emerging technology and strategically important but not yet profitable industries as a potential boondoggle that could cost taxpayers billions. The price of rebuilding national capacity, they would argue, outweighs the hard-to-quantify benefits. For more than a decade after Solyndra, the solar panel company subsidized by the Obama administration, fell into bankruptcy, this fear of failure has chilled public investment. But today’s geopolitical environment demands a different mindset. Competing with China requires accepting that some unsuccessful ventures will be inevitable. As with any fund, some investments will fail. Any given investment may be criticized in isolation, but if decisions are made by an independent board and guided by transparent criteria, they can withstand partisan swings. Broad bipartisan support for the fund’s creation and continued existence will be essential.
中 另一些人可能把对新兴技术以及有战略重要性但尚未盈利行业的公共投资，描绘成可能让纳税人损失数十亿美元的”烧钱工程”。他们会辩称，重建国家能力的代价超过了难以量化的收益。在奥巴马政府补贴的太阳能公司索林德拉（Solyndra）破产后的十多年里，对失败的恐惧一直冷却着公共投资。但今天的地缘政治环境需要不同的心态。与中国竞争，就必须接受一些不成功的项目不可避免。与任何基金一样，有些投资会失败。任何一笔投资单独拿出来都可能被批评，但只要决策由独立董事会作出、由透明标准指导，它们就能经受住党派摇摆。两党对该基金创立与存续的广泛支持将至关重要。
EN Still others opposed to government intervention in markets might criticize the SIF for picking winners and crowding out private investment. Indeed, industrial policy requires humility, and markets remain the best engine for allocating capital and determining which firms succeed. But the fund would specifically target sectors that private investors have proved unable to finance, investing across those sectors in ways that seek to preserve competition and market discipline. Crucially, the fund’s capital would be structured largely as risk-absorbing financing designed to unlock private investment, not replace it. By offering flexible terms and sending stable demand signals, the fund would in fact lower risks that currently deter institutional investors from entering strategic industries.
中 还有一些反对政府干预市场的人，可能会批评 SIF 挑选赢家、挤出私人投资。诚然，产业政策需要谦逊，市场仍是配置资本、决定谁胜谁负的最佳引擎。但该基金将专门瞄准私人投资者已被证明无力融资的部门，并以力求维护竞争与市场纪律的方式在这些部门投资。关键在于，基金资本将主要设计为吸收风险的融资，其目的是释放私人投资，而非取代私人投资。通过提供灵活条款和发出稳定需求信号，基金实际上会降低目前阻碍机构投资者进入战略产业的那些风险。
EN Those more amenable to public strategic finance in principle might point out that several mechanisms to encourage reindustrialization already exist: tax credits, which mobilize private investment in sectors such as renewable energy, and tariffs, which protect domestic industries from foreign distortion. Both are valuable instruments, but neither supplies the transaction-level coordination or tailored risk-sharing that difficult projects often require. Tax credits lower expected costs across a market but are not always sufficient to convince investors to assume the risks that come with first-of-a-kind technology: uncertain demand, permitting delays, inadequate infrastructure, or absence of financing. Tariffs can counter foreign distortion and create breathing room, but on their own, they cannot create the scale or technological edge needed for long-term competitiveness. And if they are overused, they can shelter domestic incumbents without spurring new investment or innovation.
中 那些原则上更认同公共战略金融的人可能会指出，鼓励再工业化的机制已经存在：税收抵免能在可再生能源等部门调动私人投资，关税则能保护国内产业免受外部扭曲。两者都是有价值的工具，但都无法提供困难项目常常需要的交易层面协调或量身定制的风险分担。税收抵免能降低整个市场的预期成本，但未必足以说服投资者承担首创技术伴随的风险：需求不确定、许可拖延、基础设施不足，或缺乏融资。关税可以对抗外部扭曲、创造喘息空间，但单靠关税无法创造长期竞争力所需的规模或技术优势；如果过度使用，还可能庇护国内在位者，却刺激不出新的投资或创新。
EN These instruments would still play an important complementary role to the SIF. Tax credits would continue to create marketwide incentives for investment and allow the fund to operate more selectively and patiently, intervening only at the adventurous margin where private capital remains hesitant despite available incentives. Targeted tariffs, particularly against China, would counter unfair practices and level the playing field for domestic industries. The fund would then lower the cost of building new capacity and help firms innovate and compete. Used together, they address both sides of the problem, countering subsidies while rebuilding the productive strength to compete globally.
中 这些工具仍将扮演 SIF 的重要补充角色。税收抵免将继续创造全市场的投资激励，让基金能够更有选择、更有耐心地运作，只在私人资本即便有激励仍犹豫不前的冒险边际上出手。定向关税——尤其是针对中国的——将对抗不公平做法，为国内产业创造公平竞争环境。基金则降低建设新产能的成本，帮助企业创新和竞争。三者并用，就能同时解决问题的两面：既反制补贴，又重建参与全球竞争的生产实力。
REINDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION ｜ 再工业革命
EN For more than two centuries, the United States has shaped its financial institutions to meet the strategic demands of the era. Hamilton’s Treasury built national credit in the young republic. The RFC built industrial scale during the nation’s economic nadir. The innovation agencies built America’s technological leadership as it emerged from World War II. Each moment required the same act of imagination: treating capital as a tool of national purpose and industrial power.
中 两百多年来，美国一直塑造其金融制度，以适应时代的战略需求。汉密尔顿的财政部在年轻共和国构建了国家信用；重建金融公司（RFC）在国家经济谷底时建立了工业规模；创新机构在美国从二战中崛起时打造了技术领先地位。每个时刻都需要同一种想象力：把资本当作国家目标与工业实力的工具。
EN That imagination is sorely needed today. China’s rise has forced Washington to answer whether open, market-based democracies can still mobilize capital to serve national ends. The United States still commands the world’s deepest markets and its most capable entrepreneurs. What it lacks are modern instruments to align them with long-term national aims. A strategic investment fund would ensure that the future is not only imagined in America, but made in America, too.
中 今天迫切需要这种想象力。中国的崛起迫使华盛顿回答：开放、以市场为基础的民主国家，是否还能调动资本服务于国家目标？美国依然拥有全球最深的市场和最能干的企业家，它所缺的，是把它们与长期国家目标对齐的现代工具。一个战略投资基金将确保：未来不仅在美国被构想，也在美国被制造出来。
About the Author ｜ 关于作者
EN JAKE SULLIVAN is Kissinger Professor of the Practice of Statecraft and World Order at the Harvard Kennedy School. He served as U.S. National Security Adviser from 2021 to 2025.
中 杰克·沙利文是哈佛大学肯尼迪学院基辛格治国方略与世界秩序实践教授，2021 至 2025 年任美国国家安全事务助理。
Part 2 沙利文抄袭我了（不是
打开这文章直觉上就感觉跟我的《协调赤字》是讲同一个东西，给老美建言献策嘛……
协调赤字——如何拯救美国AI
然后看到一半就想笑，先说清楚，感觉应该继续蹭一下他，毕竟这位是拜登任内的国家安全顾问，现在在肯尼迪学院教治国术，他的文章依托于其多年来的政策制定的实战经验，远比野狐禅强多啦。
但同时看到他也在思考这一个事情——如何为美国在机制上提高竞争力应对中国，这就有意思了。
他写了什么
沙利文的诊断是这样的：美国把创新和生产进行了切割，但是切割是有代价的。
他引用 Autor 和 Dorn 的说法，第二次中国冲击（China Shock 2.0）不是由廉价的出口导致的（那是1.0时代），而是技术领先本身。
中国的办法是一套去中心化的国家创新金融：一千七百多支政府引导基金，募了将近七千亿美元，配上土地和许可，专业化管理、追求回报，投向优先赛道。
同时国家还制造需求——深圳把公交和出租强制电动化，给了当时还很小的比亚迪一份确定的订单、稳定的现金流和真实的路测反馈。产业的公地就是这么被培育了出来。
在美国这边，美国拥有全世界最优深度的资本市场，但这个市场的本能是优化效率，而不是提高美国的产业韧性和产业安全。
沙利文列了三个融资障碍：
第一，核电站、晶圆厂、船坞、变压器厂、稀土精炼厂这类项目的回报取决于关税、采购规则、电网标准这些政策变量，投资人理性的选择是等待，但这种个体的谨慎，如果加总，则会造成社会层面的投资不足；（合成谬误）
第二，从原型到量产之间有一道融资断层，风投嫌转化比较慢，但又没有去公开市场募资的能力；
第三，市场无法给正外部性定价——自己投资让别人受益，资本不认为这是有价值的。所以我们常提到的正外部性，比如干中学、供应商网络、工程能力这些东西，虽然可以加强整个产业生态，但因为能力不会体现在单个公司的损益表上，而无法被资本定价。
所以沙利文其实在暗中担心政府自己的角色缺失。在美国，审批流程的软成本能耗掉几年的资本，采购断断续续给不出稳定需求，各个政府部门各干各的。他专门写了一节 Connect the Dots——他认为美国缺的不是工具，而是把工具串起来的框架。（听起来很像计划）
于是他的方案是一个联邦特许的战略投资基金（SIF），首期五百亿美元，有独立资产负债表，面向市场，和私人资本共同投资。工具以优惠融资和信用担保为主，辅以可转债和类股权工具，让纳税人分享上行。基金之上是一个内阁级的战略投资委员会，财政部牵头，商务、国防、能源、国务院和贸易代表办公室参加，把采购、关税、税收抵免、审批、信贷这些杠杆对齐。治理上是独立董事会占多数，行政总裁参议院确认、固定任期、逐笔披露审计、组合层面的回报考核。
这个基金好啊，名字我都想好了，就分两期，一期叫算地美，二期叫算力美。
他还专门回应了几个反对意见：会不会变成总统的分赃工具（他承认风险真实，答案是治理设计）；会不会像 Solyndra 一样打水漂（他说和中国竞争必须接受一部分失败）；会不会挑选赢家挤出私人投资（他说只投私人证明了投不动的领域）。
平胸而论，这是一篇非常好的文章，到底是专业的。
一致的地方
Sullivan写的和我想的一致的部分比我预想的多很多，比如我们都认为，美国的问题的核心是正外部性无法被单个企业占有，市场因此系统性地无法有效融资。
他把这条列为第三个障碍，我把它当成这是一个最主要的问题。
我们都不认为”钱不够”是主要矛盾。他花了很大篇幅讲部门之间缺乏协调，互联网黑话叫无法对齐；也是我写的重点部分，美国人在统一思想方面真的太弱了。
我们都认真对待中国，而且都拒绝照抄。他明确写了华盛顿不该整套搬北京的剧本；我在文章里划边界划得更啰嗦，因为我知道中文读者对这个话题更敏感。
我们的历史清单在复兴金融公司这里完全重合。1932年美国信贷市场失去流动性，RFC顶上去做战略投资人，投银行、公用事业、住房和制造业，它自己赚到了钱，同时也修复了市场信心；RFC有独立的资产负债表和职业化的商业管理，到1957年才清盘；它的功绩包括给二战期间的子公司国防工厂公司造了两千多座工厂和船坞，战后移交私营运营，钢铁、航空、化工的霸权，离不开RFC。这其实就是美国版的政策性银行，以国家信用为无法在市场融资的实体提供了资本，并且成功运行了二十五年。
我俩真是心有灵犀（得意）
Sullivan牛逼的地方
Sullivan还是非常牛的，体现在我们的分歧。
分歧在如下地方
谁来协调。 沙利文的答案是国家。他要新建一个机构，再新建一个委员会去协调这个机构和其他机构。我的答案是私人资本自己。国家要做的是减法：把阻止企业之间合法互相担保、合法联合投资、合法在网络层面核账的那些法律障碍搬开。他加了一个机构更像中国了，我还想让他们保有资本主义的灵魂，他比我走的还远啊，同志。
约束条件是什么。 沙利文的隐含判断是这件事还没人做，所以需要国家开个头。我的判断相反：这件事早就在做了，规模远超五百亿，只是没有合法的表达形式。超大规模云厂商在扮演有财政基础的地方政府，数据中心 SPV 在扮演城投，Blue Owl 和 Apollo 在扮演政策性银行，照付不议合同在扮演隐性担保，英伟达投 OpenAI、OpenAI 承诺采购甲骨文、甲骨文采购英伟达在扮演企业互保网络。这套结构已经存在，它之所以长成伯里眼里的骗局形态，是因为一旦写成显性的交叉持股和担保合约，立刻构成反垄断证据。
这里我比他走的远，他对金融还是不熟悉。
这是第二个分岔：反垄断。沙利文全文没有提到它一次。他的方案可以在现行反垄断框架下完整实施——建基金、开委员会、签长期采购，一条都不碰《克莱顿法》。而我那篇文章本质上是一份反垄断改革提案。我认为美国的问题不是缺一个公共投资者，是它用国家权力强制执行了”单一公司损益表是唯一合法账本”这条意识形态，把已经形成的担保网络逼到了地下，并因此让它更危险。
读的是哪个中国。 沙利文读的是引导基金——股权、专业管理、追求回报、地方试错。我读的是城投——债权、担保、永远不产生会计利润、价值实现在实体之外由地方政府通过土地财政捕获。他眼里的中国是一个主权风投；我眼里的中国是一个担保网络。这个思想上的分歧直接决定了不同的药方：如果中国是主权风投，那美国的对应物就该是主权风投；如果中国是担保网络，那美国要做的是让私人担保网络合法化。
这是核心分歧，怎么说呢，我只感觉他还不够大胆……
记账单位。 这一条我觉得也算是实质的分歧。沙利文的基金仍然在企业层面核账，只是这个投资人风险偏好更高、久期更长、能接受更多失败。逐笔投资仍然要回答”这个项目算不算得过来”，基金整体仍然有组合层面的回报考核。而我那篇的整个论点是：真正重要的项目在实体层面永远算不过来，也不应该要求它算得过来，所以修的应该是核算单位本身——从公司移到网络。他扩大了投资人的胃口，我主张掀桌换一张账本。
纪律从哪来。 沙利文回答分赃质疑的办法是治理设计：独立董事会、公开标准、逐笔披露、审计、两党共识。这是行政式的纪律。我那篇给的答案是可做空性——把担保关系从商业合同的伪装里拽出来，做成有资本金、有定价、有强制披露的显性担保池，悲观者比如burry终于可以拿到干净的做空标的了，可以直接做空担保池信用。中国靠行政力量周期性化债来纠偏，美国可以让做空者持续纠偏。
这是我唯一觉得自己那篇可能真的加了一点东西的地方。沙利文提出了腐败风险这个问题，但他的答案全部落在治理程序上，而治理程序的历史记录并不好看。市场纪律未必更好。
政治风险的方向也是反的。 他担心的是公权力被滥用，总统用基金奖赏亲信。我担心的是私权力不受问责，布兰代斯的幽灵。
同一种恐惧，不同的应对。这很合理，因为我们的方案本来就指向相反。
沙利文的洞见
审批。 沙利文反复强调，很多项目卡住的不是资本，是许可。美国的核电和矿物加工领域，穿越联邦、州、地方三层监管消耗掉的几年时间里不产生任何有形价值。我没有想到这个维度，因为……我是中国人啊，谁知道他们如此落后。
我默认约束是金融的和法律的（反垄断），但对一座变压器厂来说，真正的约束很可能是三年拿不到许可证。
盟友。 他讲英国2024年设立的三百七十亿美元国家财富基金，讲澳大利亚的 Future Made in Australia，讲用 CHIPS 法案引台积电和三星到美国建厂的先例，讲基金作为盟友之间投资协调平台的可能。这个非常符合FA的风格，实在是没想到。这个确实很重要
产业分类。 他把产业分成两类：
造船、基础电池这类成熟而同质的重资本行业，靠规模、学习曲线和外国补贴决胜负，国家的任务是恢复一条基线产能，然后退出；
先进机器人、下一代核能、生物技术这类创新驱动的行业，卡在原型和量产之间，需要的是灵活的耐心资本。
我那篇给的是一套单一机制，对所有情况一视同仁。这个分类非常老道。
一点感想
我认真读了两遍他的文章，沙利文从基金出发，最后落到”公共资本要吸引私人资本、不是替代私人资本”，这个很复古的资本主义的政策建议。
我从掀桌出发，第五条建议还是绕回了一个常设的、带股权上行的最后担保人。
他把基金放在第一位，我把它放在第四条减法之后，并且明确写了这是五条里风险最高的一条，因为一个按预期用量定价的市场，反身性远强于按已实现利润定价的市场，逆周期担保人是必备的。
如果要给他那篇提一条批评，我会说：五百亿美元，甚至五千亿美元，放在正在发生的资本开支规模面前都不构成量级。真正有杠杆的变量不是公共资产负债表的大小，是私人资产负债表能不能合法地连起来。信用担保确实能撬动倍数，但这个倍数要一笔一笔地穿过一个联邦机构；而允许企业之间显性互保，在财政上没有天花板。
沙利文说，把资本变成能力——但资本变成能力的瓶颈，在我看来不在美国财政部有多少弹药，而在于反垄断法允不允许资本自己去放开手脚。
God Bless America